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Abstract  This  paper  analyzes  opportunity  entrepreneurship  through  the  interplay  between
formal  and  informal  institutions.  It  seems  evident  that  not  all  entrepreneurial  initiatives  have
the  same  quality,  thus  the  goal  of  a  society  should  be  to  encourage  the  activities  that  best
contribute  to  innovation  and  value  generation.  We  theorize  that  informal  institutions  are  con-
tingent  to  the  formal  institutional  environment  where  the  new  ventures  operate.  Our  empirical
results,  using  GEM  data,  confirm  that,  in  countries  with  a  more  individualistic  orientation,  the
relationship  between  formal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship  is  more  intense,  as
happens  in  societies  with  lower  levels  of  uncertainty  avoidance.
© 2018  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC















Entrepreneurship  has  become  a  phenomenon  of  paramount
importance that  is  receiving  increasing  attention  in  recent
years (Acs,  2006;  Wennekers  et  al.,  2005;  Barba-Sánchez
and Atienza-Sahuquillo,  2017).  Given  its  relationship  to  eco-
nomic  growth  and  wealth  (Minniti,  2008),  it  has  attracted
the interest  of  scholars  and  policy  makers  alike  to  identify
both the  factors  that  encourage  entrepreneurship  and  the
type of  entrepreneurship  that  generates  higher  externalities
for society  (Baumol,  1990;  Sobel  2008).
Extant  empirical  evidence,  mainly  from  reports  and
monographs, shows  that  the  level  of  entrepreneurship  varies
greatly across  countries.  The  explanation  of  these  differ-Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
contingent  role  of  informal  institutions.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2018
∗ Corresponding author.






2340-9436/© 2018 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).nces  has  evolved  from  works  that  analyze  the  levels  of
ntrepreneurship across  countries  in  an  undifferentiated
ay (i.e.  evaluating  the  differences  in  absolute  terms)  to
he most  recent  stream  that  introduces  the  idea  that  not  all
ypes of  entrepreneurship  are  equally  desirable,  suggesting
hat a  more  granular  analysis  is  needed.  Therefore,  it  seems
onvenient to  go  one  step  further  when  explaining  country
ifferences paying  attention  not  only  to  entrepreneurship
evels but  also  to  the  type  of  entrepreneurship  that  charac-
erizes a specific  region  (Baumol,  1990).
To  increase  our  knowledge  of  the  differences  in
ntrepreneurship levels  among  countries,  the  literature
as incorporated  the  institutional  component  as  a  fac-
or that  either  enables  or  hinders  entrepreneurial  activityrmal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
Belitski et  al.,  2016;  Aidis  et  al.,  2012;  Stenholm  et  al.,
013; Minh  and  Hjortsø,  2015;  Aparicio  et  al.,  2016).
owever, despite  the  growing  body  of  studies  examin-
ng the  influence  of  institutions  on  different  types  of











































































































tional environment  provides  the  necessary  conditions  for
individuals to  identify  market  opportunities,  start  new  activ-
ities, introduce  innovations  and  new  products  or  services
1 If we consider the distinction adopted by GEM between factor-
,  efficiency- and innovation-driven countries, Estrin et al. (2013)
sample  only includes two countries (less than 5%) in the factor-ARTICLERQ-92; No. of Pages 20
 
ntrepreneurial  initiatives,  several  gaps  are  still  underex-
lored.
One of  the  most  important  calls  made  by  the  liter-
ture is  that  these  studies  should  incorporate  a  more
ne-grained analysis  that  integrates  formal  and  informal
nstitutions (Aidis  et  al.,  2008).  This  is  because  firms,  when
nalyzing the  institutional  landscape,  face  not  only  the  for-
al dimension  but  also  the  informal  one,  as  well  as  to
onsider the  potential  interdependences  that  could  take
lace between  them  (Peng  et  al.,  2009).  Thus,  our  under-
tanding of  the  institutional  context  is  that  it  works  as
 multidimensional,  complex  and  interdependent  system
Hutzschenreuter et  al.,  2016).
Some  studies  have  started  to  address  this  problem  empir-
cally. For  instance,  Li  and  Zahra  (2012),  in  a  paper  that
nalyzes the  variance  of  venture  capital  activity  depend-
ng on  both  different  levels  of  formal  institutions  and
ifferent cultural  settings,  suggest  that,  in  the  study  of
he quality  of  entrepreneurship,  it  is  necessary  to  adopt
n institutional  perspective  that  takes  these  two  dimen-
ions into  account.  Similarly,  Estrin  et  al.  (2013a)  explain
ntrepreneurial growth  aspirations  across  individuals  and
nstitutional contexts,  suggesting  that  higher  levels  of  cor-
uption, weaker  property  rights  and  greater  government
ctivity significantly  constrain  entrepreneurial  employment
rowth aspirations.  At  the  same  time,  they  argue  that  local
ocial networks  mitigate  the  effects  of  some  of  these  insti-
utional deficiencies.
This joint  analysis  of  formal  and  informal  institutions
hen explaining  the  type  of  entrepreneurship  constitutes
ur first  contribution.  Theoretically,  we  follow  the  idea  that
ormal institutions  are  embedded  within  a  broader  con-
ext represented  by  informal  institutions,  that  is,  informal
nstitutions operate  at  a  deeper  level  than  formal  ones
DiMaggio, 1988;  North,  1990).  These  authors  maintain  that
he development  of  formal  institutions  may  reinforce  or
onstrain the  effects  of  informal  ones.  This  means,  for  ins-
ance, that  the  latter  become  predominant  when  the  former
ail (Helmke  and  Levitsky,  2004;  Peng  et  al.,  2009).  Accord-
ngly, our  work  will  consider  that  the  relationship  between
he development  of  formal  institutions  and  opportunity
ntrepreneurship is  contingent  to  the  cultural  characteris-
ics of  the  country.  We  specifically  focus  on  the  two  cultural
imensions that  have  been  more  clearly  connected  with
ntrepreneurship, namely,  the  individualistic  character  of
 society  and  uncertainty  avoidance  (Mueller  and  Thomas,
001; Tiessen,  1997;  Li  and  Zahra,  2012).  Our  hypotheses
uggest that  these  distinctive  dimensions  of  the  informal
nstitutional environment  moderate  the  relation  between
ormal institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.
Our  research  also  contributes  to  the  literature  by  focus-
ng on  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  Previous  research  has
egun  to  study  the  relationship  between  institutions  and
pportunity entrepreneurship,  postulating,  for  instance,
hat a  country’s  institutional  environment  influences  the
xtent to  which  entrepreneurial  effort  is  directed  toward
igh-growth activities  (Bowen  and  De  Clercq,  2008),  or  ana-
yzing the  effect  of  the  regulatory  burden  and  rule  of  lawPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
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n strategic  and  non-strategic  entrepreneurship  entry  rates
Levie and  Autio,  2011).  We  should  notice  here  that  we
efine opportunity  entrepreneurship  as  one  that  identifies
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ore  new  jobs  and  has  a  strong  correlation  with  high  growth
rms (Wennekers  et  al.,  2005;  Hechavarria  and  Reynolds,
009). According  to  Reynolds  et  al.  (2002),  we  can  differen-
iate between  opportunity  and  necessity  entrepreneurship.
he former,  in  which  a  new  venture  starts  to  pursue  an
ttractive business  opportunity,  leads  to  greater  employ-
ent growth,  higher  exports  and  sometimes  creates  new
arket niches.  By  contrast,  necessity  entrepreneurship,
here individuals  are  pushed  into  entrepreneurship  by
ircumstances, usually  has  a  more  modest  impact  on  eco-
omic development  (Acs,  2006).  Because  of  the  purpose
f this  work,  we  will  use  a  broad  concept  of  opportunity
ntrepreneur and  consider  terms  such  as  productive,  high
uality, strategic  or  high  growth  entrepreneurship  as  syn-
nymous.
Our analysis  is  close  to  Estrin  et  al.  (2013a)  in  the  sense
hat we  also  analyze  the  interaction  between  formal  and
nformal institutions  and  its  effect  on  entrepreneurship  and
hat we  focus  on  high-growth  entrepreneurship.  However,
t differs  from  Estrin  et  al.  (2013a)  and  related  research
n several  points.  First,  we  contribute  to  the  literature  by
pproaching informal  institutions  (culture)  in  a  substantially
ifferent way.  Culture  is  a complex  phenomenon  and  we
onsider two  moderating  variables  that  have  been  deemed
specially important  in  the  entrepreneurship  literature,
amely, individualism  and  uncertainty  avoidance.  Second,
ur time  horizon  is  much  longer  than  that  considered  by
strin et  al.  (2013a).  While  Estrin  et  al.  (2013a)  use  data  for
 five-year  period  (2001--2005),  our  analysis  is  from  14  years
2002--2015). Third,  our  sample  includes  a  greater  number
f countries  (84  instead  of  42),  and,  what  is  more  impor-
ant, our  analysis  is  less  biased  toward  developed  countries
ecause many  developing  countries  have  started  to  partici-
ate in  the  GEM  project  in  recent  years.1
This  international  dimension  and  the  presence  of  coun-
ries from  different  economic  environments  provide  us  with
nough variability  in  the  institutional  dimensions,  which
s strongly  recommended  in  studies  analyzing  the  influ-
nce of  the  institutional  context  (Franke  and  Richey,  2010).
he use  of  a  common  methodology  facilitates  comparisons
nd gives  credibility  to  the  results  obtained  in  an  interna-
ional scenario.  Furthermore,  GEM  identifies  several  types
f entrepreneurship,  which  will  be  useful  to  operationalize
ur dependent  variable  that  is  also  different  to  the  one  use
y Estrin  et  al.  (2013a).
iterature review: institutions and
ntrepreneurship
xtant  literature  has  proved  that  an  appropriate  institu-rmal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
riven  stage (India and Venezuela) while 19% of the countries in our
ample  belong to this group. Contrarily, 38% of the countries in our
ample  are in the innovation-drive stage, compared with a 57% in
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Formal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The  c
and  generate  employment  (Verheul  et  al.,  2002;  El-Namaki,
1988; Baumol,  2002).  Likewise,  the  quality  of  the  insti-
tutional context  influences  the  allocation  of  the  different
types of  entrepreneurship  (Baumol,  1990).
To  determine  the  relevant  institutions  for  entrepreneur-
ship dynamics,  it  is  necessary  to  precisely  define  the  term
institution. North  (1990)  defines  institutions  as  the  rules  of
the game  that  guide  the  behavior  of  individuals  and  provide
the structure  of  incentives  to  the  agents,  reducing  trans-
action problems.  In  this  sense,  institutions  can  facilitate
economic, political  and  social  interactions,  creating  incen-
tives for  different  courses  of  action  and  guiding  the  election
of the  economic  actors  (Boettke  and  Coyne,  2009).  When
these rules  are  well  defined,  opportunism  decreases,  trust
increases and  so  does  the  enforcement  of  long-term  con-
tracts, reducing  transaction  costs  and  leading  to  an  efficient
institutional structure  (Arias  and  Caballero,  2006).  On  the
contrary, ‘‘poor  quality  institutions  reduce  the  incentive  to
invest and  prevent  resources  being  allocated  to  their  most
productive end’’  (Knowles  and  Weatherson,  2006,  p.10).
In  a  broad  sense,  the  literature  usually  distinguishes
between formal  and  informal  institutions  (North,  1990).
Generally speaking,  the  first  can  be  understood  as  a  set
of political,  economic  and  regulatory  rules  that  facili-
tate exchanges.  The  second  are  rules  that  have  not  been
designed consciously  but  come  from  the  information  that
has been  socially  transmitted  through  what  we  call  culture
(North, 1990).
There is  a  growing  body  of  literature  that  tries  to
link institutions  with  entrepreneurship.  Factors  like  gover-
nance (Dau  and  Cuervo-Cazurra,  2014),  economic  freedom
(McMullen et  al.,  2008),  property  rights  and  financial  capital
(Bowen and  De  Clercq,  2008;  Desai  et  al.,  2003),  regulation
of entry  (Klapper  et  al.,  2006)  and  control  of  corruption
(Anokhin and  Schulze,  2009)  are  some  of  the  key  for-
mal institutional  factors  considered.  McMullen  et  al.  (2008)
show how  the  institutional  context  influences  opportunity
and necessity  entrepreneurship  in  different  ways.  Bowen
and De  Clercq  (2008)  demonstrate  that  the  allocation  of
entrepreneurial resources  toward  high-growth  activities  is
positively related  to  financing  and  education  and  negatively
to the  level  of  corruption  in  a  country.  In  the  same  way,
Anokhin and  Schulze  (2009)  show  that  the  control  of  cor-
ruption increases  the  trust  of  individuals  in  government
and encourages  entrepreneurial  activities  and  innovation.
Recent research  supports  the  idea  that  higher  levels  of  cor-
ruption, weaker  property  rights  and  a  greater  government
activity reduce  entrepreneurs’  aspirations  of  growth  (Estrin
et al.,  2013a).
A large  body  of  research  also  discusses  the  infor-
mal institutional  dimension  and  its  relationship  with
entrepreneurship. Previous  work  has  focused  on  issues
such as  entrepreneurial  traits  or  characteristics  of  the
entrepreneur (Mueller  and  Thomas,  2001;  Thomas  and
Mueller, 2000),  entrepreneurial  intention  (Entrialgo  and
Iglesias, 2016),  the  formation  rates  of  new  firms  at
the regional  or  national  level  (Davidsson  and  Wiklund,
1997), entrepreneurial  orientation  (Lee  and  Peterson,  2000;Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
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Tiessen, 1997),  innovation  (Shane  1992,  1993)  and  the  social
dimension of  entrepreneurship  (Estrin  et  al.,  2013b;  Stephan
et al.,  2015).  Kreiser  et  al.  (2010)  argue  that  national
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lay  risk  taking  and  proactive  behaviors,  two  key  dimensions
f entrepreneurial  orientation.  Levie  and  Hunt  (2004)  ana-
yze the  role  of  culture  in  entrepreneurship  and  conclude
hat there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  new  business
ctivity-related beliefs  and  the  level  of  new  business  activ-
ty, but  they  do  not  find  empirical  evidence  for  the  direct
ssociation between  cultural  values  and  entrepreneurship.
utio et  al.  (2013)  analyze  the  influence  of  national  culture
n aspects  such  as  entry  behaviors  and  post-entry  aspi-
ations. In  the  same  way,  Liñán  and  Fernández-Serrano
2014) and  Hechavarria  and  Reynolds  (2009)  show  that
ulture is  a  significant  factor  in  predicting  entrepreneur-
hip rates  at  the  country  level.  More  recent  studies  find  a
ositive relationship  between  the  potential  entrepreneurs’
erception of  approval  and  support  from  their  families
nd closest  environments  and  entrepreneurial  attitude  and
ow entrepreneurial  education  moderates  this  relationship
Entrialgo and  Iglesias,  2016).  Dheer  (2017)  suggests  that
ndividualism positively  moderates  the  effects  of  politi-
al freedom  and  education,  and  negatively  moderates  the
ffect of  corruption,  on  the  rate  of  entrepreneurial  activity
cross nations.
To sum  up,  the  previous  literature  review  reveals  that
he relationship  between  both  formal  and  informal  institu-
ions and  entrepreneurship  is  well  documented.  However,
here are  still  significant  gaps  with  respect  to  the  possible
elationships between  the  two  types  of  institutions  that  are
ecessary to  fill  in  order  to  provide  a  more  accurate  pic-
ure of  their  relation  with  entrepreneurship.  This  study  is  an
ttempt to  advance  in  the  understanding  of  the  joint  effect
f the  two  types  of  institutions  on  entrepreneurship  and,
ore specifically,  in  the  moderating  effect  of  informal  insti-
utions on  the  relationship  between  formal  institutions  and
ntrepreneurship. In  the  following  section,  we  elaborate  on
his.
ypotheses
he  relation  between  formal  institutions  and
pportunity entrepreneurship
ormal  institutions  are  a  multidimensional  concept  that
ncludes aspects  such  as  political,  economic  and  legisla-
ive systems  (Pejovich,  1999).  These  dimensions  define
he nature  of  the  political  processes,  decrease  uncer-
ainty, facilitate  the  necessary  managerial  efforts  to  acquire
esources at  the  start  of  a  new  venture  (Busenitz  et  al.,
000), increase  the  availability  of  financial  resources
Holmes et  al.,  2013)  and  are  the  basis  or  infrastructure
hich makes  development  possible  (De  Soto,  2000).  In  gen-
ral, formal  institutions  provide  the  framework  of  trust
hat the  entrepreneur  needs  when  starting  up  a  business.
hey also  facilitate  the  perception  of  business  opportuni-
ies and  influence  their  number  and  characteristics  (Verheul
t al.,  2002).  This  will  result  in  an  increase  in  the  level
f entrepreneurial  activity,  as  well  as  in  the  aspirationsrmal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
f growth,  in  the  size  of  the  new  companies  (Levie  and
utio, 2008)  and  in  the  proportion  of  registered  businesses
n comparison  to  those  that  takes  place  outside  the  official
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Accordingly,  an  environment  with  a  transparent  legal  sys-
em and  clearly  defined  property  rights  mitigates  the  risks
aken by  the  agents  who  provide  funds  for  entrepreneurs
Estrin et  al.,  2013a).  This  facilitates  access  to  financing,
sually a  key  factor  for  the  creation  and  growth  of  new
usinesses (Rajan  and  Zingales  1998).  As  a  consequence,
ore developed  formal  institutions  promote,  for  exam-
le, the  investment  of  venture  capital  (Sobel,  2008;  Li  and
ahra, 2012),  an  especially  relevant  alternative  for  financing
rojects in  contexts  of  high  uncertainty  but  high  potential
rowth (Bowen  and  De  Clercq,  2008).  Other  factors,  such
s the  protection  of  property  rights,  have  also  been  posi-
ively related  to  innovation  (Dau  and  Cuervo-Cazurra,  2014),
rowth aspirations  (Autio  and  Acs,  2010),  the  size  of  new
ompanies (Kumar  et  al.,  1999),  and  the  reinvestment  of
rofits (Johnson  et  al.,  2002).  It  has  also  been  demonstrated
hat the  control  of  corruption  increases  trust  in  institutions
nd markets  and  makes  it  more  likely  for  entrepreneurs  to
ppropriate a  portion  of  the  rewards  that  can  be  earned  by
ncouraging entrepreneurship  and  innovation  (Anokhin  and
chulze, 2009).
On the  contrary,  weak  formal  institutions  can  constitute
n important  limitation  for  entrepreneurship  and,  in  par-
icular, for  the  growth  and  quality  of  business  initiatives
Krasniqi and  Desai,  2016).  For  example,  an  excess  of  entry
egulation increases  the  profits  necessary  to  compensate
or the  opportunity  costs  of  other  investment  alterna-
ives, discouraging  opportunity  entrepreneurship  (Ho  and
ong, 2007)  and  reorienting  marginal  businesses  to  the
hadow -- unproductive,  in  the  Baumolian  terminology  --
conomy (De  Soto  1989,  2000;  Jiménez  et  al.,  2015).  Simi-
arly, the  absence  of  property  rights  protection  discourages
ntrepreneurship and  productivity  because  individuals  are
keptical about  realizing  the  gains  of  their  productive  efforts
Williamson and  Mathers,  2011).  Furthermore,  financial  con-
traints limit  investments  in  high  growth  projects  (Beck
t al.,  2005).  In  general,  regulatory  complexity  discourages
ob creation  and,  in  some  cases,  limits  the  growth  aspira-
ions of  quality  entrepreneurship  (Verheul  et  al.,  2002).
Furthermore,  a  weak  formal  institutional  structure  not
nly limits  opportunity,  high-impact  activities  but  also  leads
o an  increase  in  low-impact  ones  (Mehlum  et  al.,  2006).  It
as been  observed  that  when  tax  rates  or  corruption  levels
re high  or  there  are  market  restrictions,  economic  activ-
ty moves  from  formal  to  informal  economy  (Johnson  et  al.,
998; Schneider  and  Enste,  2000).  In  line  with  this  argument,
oyne and  Leeson  (2004)  argue  that  political  and  legal  insta-
ility lead  to  the  non-performance  of  contracts  because  it
s easier  to  ignore  the  laws  than  to  keep  them,  increasing
he level  of  corruption  and  the  informal  economy.  In  the
ame way,  ‘‘the  lack  of  an  effective  court  system  limits
he expansion  of  one’s  network  of  clients,  lenders  or  sup-
liers and  makes  it  extremely  difficult  for  entrepreneurs  to
xtend their  network  beyond  a  few  close  friends  and  neigh-
ors whom  they  know  well’’  (Coyne  and  Leeson  2004,  p.
42).
To sum  up,  the  existence  of  institutional  structures  that
uarantee the  safety  of  property  rights  and  a  fair  judicialPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
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ystem that  allows  the  correct  enforcement  of  contracts
akes individuals  more  likely  to  take  part  in  the  generation
f wealth  through  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  Accord-
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1.  The  greater  the  development  of  formal  institutions,
he higher  the  level  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship.
he  moderating  effect  of  informal  institutions
he  previous  section  has  argued  that  the  existence  of  sound
ormal institutions  leads  to  an  environment  that  encourages
pportunity entrepreneurship  (McMullen  et  al.,  2008).  How-
ver, the  evidence  suggests  that  the  same  formal  institutions
how different  effects  in  different  societies  (North,  1990;
cs, 2006)  or  that  they  even  interact  with  the  informal  ones
De Soto,  2006).  This  can  be  due,  at  least  partially,  to  the
act that  formal  institutions  coexist  with  informal  ones  and
hat both,  as  well  as  their  interdependences,  have  to  be
onsidered for  the  correct  interpretation  of  the  institutional
imension (Helmke  and  Levitsky,  2004;  Williamson,  2000).  In
his sense,  North’s  (1990)  institutional  theory  explains  that
ormal institutions  are  the  result  of  the  crystallization  of  the
nformal component  and  that  they  co-evolve  through  orga-
izations. Formal  institutions  are  subordinated  to  informal
nes in  that  the  former  are  the  means  used  to  structure  the
nteractions of  the  society  in  accordance  with  the  norms  and
alues that  the  latter  represent.
Informal  institutions  are  self-regulating  but  ‘‘where  the
ormal institutions  do  not  reflect  the  underlying  informal
orms, formal  institutions  will  be  costly  to  enforce  because
he formal  rules  governing  society  will  be  at  odds  with
he underlying  belief  systems’’  (Boettke  and  Coyne  2009,
. 142).  In  contrast,  where  formal  norms  are  in  line  with
nformal ones,  the  cost  of  implementing  the  former  will  be
elatively low  and  they  will  be  accepted,  supported  and
eveloped over  time  (Weingast,  1995).  More  importantly,
nstitutions are  often  context  dependent  and  it  is  not  easy
o transplant  them  from  one  context  to  another  due  to  what
oettke et  al.  (2008)  define  as  institutional  stickiness.
Following  the  above  reasoning,  Garretsen  et  al.  (2004)
evelop a  cluster  analysis  to  identify  patterns  of  behavior
n accordance  with  social  and  legal  norms  and  demonstrate
hat sociocultural  variables  allow  legal  institutions  to  bet-
er achieve  their  objectives.  Licht  et  al.  (2001)  reach  similar
onclusions when  relating  the  rights  of  investors  and  cultural
actors. They  demonstrate  that  cultural  factors  determine
hat types  of  legal  systems  can  be  perceived  and  accepted
s legitimate  in  a  country.  Similarly,  Li  and  Zahra  (2012,  p.
6) suggest  that  ‘‘formal  institutions  are  important  for  ven-
ure capital  activity  but  the  effects  of  formal  institutions
epend also  on  the  cultural  settings’’.
In  accordance  with  these  arguments,  we  can  con-
lude that  when  informal  institutions  (understood  as  the
alue system  of  a  group  or  society),  improve  the  social
esire toward  entrepreneurship  as  a  choice  of  occupation
Stenholm et  al.,  2013),  individuals  are  more  receptive  to
he incentives  offered  by  formal  institutions.  As  a  conse-
uence, formal  institutions  cannot  be  analyzed  in  isolation,
iven that  informal  ones  (culture)  moderate  their  effect  on
ntrepreneurship.
Culture has  been  approached  in  several  ways  but,  proba-rmal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
ly, the  framework  most  frequently  used  by  the  literature  is
he one  proposed  by  Hofstede  (2001)  and  Hofstede  et  al.
2010). Among  the  six  dimensions  this  author  develops
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Formal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The  c
vs  femininity,  uncertainty  avoidance,  long-term  orientation
and indulgence  vs  restriction),  our  analysis  will  focus  on  the
two more  clearly  linked  to  entrepreneurship  and  its  typol-
ogy (see,  for  example,  Thomas  and  Mueller,  2000;  Li  and
Zahra, 2012;  Mueller  and  Thomas,  2001,  or  Levie  and  Hunt,
2004): individualism  and  uncertainty  avoidance.  Greenfield
(2000, p.  230)  highlights  the  importance  of  ‘‘individualism
and collectivism  as  a  universal  deep  structure  of  cultural
differentiation’’, where  ‘‘particular  cultures  are  therefore
surface forms  of  one  or  the  other  of  these  basic  cultu-
ral frameworks’’  (Greenfield,  2000,  p.  223).  Thomas  and
Mueller (2000)  show  that  dimensions  such  as  motivation  to
the achievement  and  the  pursuit  of  personal  goals,  inter-
nal locus  of  control,  risk  taking  and  innovativeness  (Mueller
and Thomas,  2001;  Shane  1993)  are  significantly  related
to the  profile  of  the  entrepreneur  and  are  usually  linked
to individualism.  For  instance,  Mueller  and  Thomas  (2001)
found that  cultures  with  higher  levels  of  individualism  and
lower levels  of  uncertainty  avoidance  are  more  supportive  of
entrepreneurship and  innovation  than  cultures  that  are  col-
lectivist  and  more  risk  averse.  McGrath  et  al.  (1992)  reach
similar conclusions  when  they  compare  entrepreneurs  and
non-entrepreneurs. Other  studies,  such  as  that  of  Levie  and
Hunt (2004),  investigate  the  role  of  culture  for  opportu-
nity and  necessity  entrepreneurs.  They  found  that  countries
with low  individualism  have  more  necessity  entrepreneurs,
while there  is  no  correlation  between  individualism  and
opportunity entrepreneurship  or  total  entrepreneurial  activ-
ity. Finally,  Li  and  Zahra  (2012)  found  that  higher  levels
of uncertainty  avoidance  and  collectivism  weaken  the  pos-
itive relationship  between  formal  institutions  and  the  level
of venture  capital  activity  in  a  country.  Similarly,  other
authors, such  as  Baughn  and  Neupert  (2003,  p.  327),  suggest
that ‘‘These  two  dimensions  help  predict  financial,  regula-
tory, and  legal  structures  favoring  new  business  start-ups’’.
To sum  up,  individualism  and  uncertainty  avoidance  seem
to be  the  two  cultural  dimensions  more  closely  related  to
the decision  to  become  an  entrepreneur.  As  a  consequence,
in what  follows,  we  will  elaborate  on  their  interplay  with
formal institutions.
Individualism  vs  collectivism
Individualism is  one  of  the  most  representative  dimensions
of culture  (Autio  et  al.,  2013)  and  it  is  considered  to  be  a
key element  when  it  comes  to  describing  changes  in  behav-
ior, attitudes,  norms,  values,  goals  and  family  structures
(Triandis 1996).  At  the  same  time,  individualism  has  fre-
quently been  associated  with  studies  on  entrepreneurship
(Cullen et  al.,  2013).
Individualism  cannot  be  defined  independently  but  must
be understood  as  part  of  a  continuum  in  which  individual-
ism and  collectivism  are  located  at  opposite  ends  (Hofstede,
2001). In  individualistic  cultures,  individuals  are  more  moti-
vated by  their  own  personal  interest  and  the  achievement  of
personal goals  than  by  group  achievements  (Triandis,  1993),
thus making  it  more  difficult  to  identify  collective  targets.
By contrast,  in  collectivist  societies,  individuals  are  consid-Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
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ered to  be  a  part  of  a  group  from  birth  and  are  motivated
to achieve  rewards  at  group  level  (Triandis  et  al.,  1988).
It  is  important  to  emphasize  that,  in  these  individ-
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ollective  punishment  does  not  exist  for  the  breaching  of
ontracts, trust  lies  in  contractual  safety  (Tiessen,  1997;
teensma et  al.,  2000).  In  these  societies,  collective  actions,
xchanges and  the  enforcement  of  contracts  and  norms
re obtained  through  the  development  of  specialized  for-
al institutions  (Greif,  1994).  Therefore,  formal  institutions
n those  cultures  play  ‘‘a  central  role  in  enforcing  con-
racts, mitigating  transaction  cost  problems  and  providing
he proper  incentive  structure  for  economic  transactions’’
Li and  Zahra,  2012,  p.  99).  These  arguments  are  in  line
ith those  offered  by  Gorodnichenko  and  Roland  (2010)  who
onclude that  individualism  encourages  and  strengthens  the
nforcement of  norms  and  formal  regulations.
On  the  contrary,  in  collectivist  societies,  individuals
nteract at  the  social  and  economic  level  with  the  mem-
ers of  family  groups  and  the  fulfillment  of  contracts  is
btained through  informal  economic  and  social  institutions.
n these  countries,  ‘‘the  employment  of  informal  relation-
hips to  tackle  transaction  problems  may  not  help  with  the
evelopment of  formal  institutions’’  (Li  and  Zahra,  2012,
. 99),  these  being  less  necessary  since  the  government  of
he country  relies  on  loyalty  to  the  group  and  power  hierar-
hy (Gaygisiz,  2013).  Based  on  the  above,  we  argue  that
ndividualistic societies,  that  encourage  the  discovery  of
pportunities, creativity  and  innovation,  and  have  a  greater
cceptance of  entrepreneurship  at  a social  level,  strengthen
he effect  of  formal  institutions  in  their  attempt  to  encour-
ging opportunity  entrepreneurship.
2. The  more  individualism,  the  stronger  the  positive  rela-
ionship between  formal  institutional  development  and  the
evel of  opportunity  entrepreneurship.
ncertainty avoidance
nother important  dimension  that  influences  entrepreneur-
hip is  uncertainty  avoidance  (Autio  et  al.,  2013;  Mueller
nd Thomas,  2001;  Wennekers  et  al.,  2007).  Uncertainty  is  a
entral concept  when  speaking  about  entrepreneurship  and,
articularly, or  start-up  entrepreneurs  who  are  unable  to
alculate the  expected  profits  of  new  ventures  (Wennekers
t al.,  2007).  Uncertainty  avoidance,  unlike  risk  aversion,
hich pertains  to  individuals,  shows  a  wide  within-group  dis-
ersion and  can  be  insured  against,  is  usually  understood  as  a
roup or  country  attribute  (Wennekers  et  al.,  2007).  Accord-
ng to  Hofstede  (2001),  uncertainty  refers  to  the  level  of
olerance of  societies  to  ambiguity  and  the  extent  to  which
hey feel  threatened  by  unknown,  uncertain  and  new  situa-
ions. Uncertainty  implies,  therefore,  differences  in  how
ndividuals perceive  the  opportunities  and  threats  of  the
nvironment and  how  they  react  to  them  (Schneider  and  De
eyer, 1991).  In  societies  with  greater  uncertainty  avoid-
nce, there  is  less  tolerance  of  ambiguity,  fear  of  failure
s greater  and  willingness  to  take  risks  is  lower  (Hofstede,
980). On  the  other  hand,  low  uncertainty  avoidance  is  asso-
iated with  optimism  and  a  positive  evaluation  of  uncertain
ituations (Schneider  and  De  Meyer,  1991),  with  the  subse-
uent search  for  opportunities  and  the  assumption  of  greater
isks (Palich  and  Bagby,  1995).rmal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
Uncertainty  avoidance  influences  the  way  in  which  other
ariables affect  business  undertaking  (Wennekers  et  al.,
007). We  have  previously  argued  a  positive  relationship
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hip.  However,  this  relationship  is  contingent  to  the  level
f uncertainty  avoidance.  For  low  levels  of  this  societal
rait, individuals  are  more  likely  to  participate  in  activities
ith uncertain  outcomes,  becoming  more  innovative,  more
roactive and  more  open  to  new  norms  and  laws  (Yan  and
unt, 2005).  In  this  context,  sound  formal  institutions  are
articularly important  because  they  provide  the  framework
o develop  economic  activity.  On  the  contrary,  when  formal
nstitutions are  weak,  new  firms  are  created  in  a  much  more
ncertain context,  thus  reducing  the  incentives  to  start  the
entures.
When uncertainty  avoidance  is  high,  individuals  are  less
illing to  take  risks  and  entrepreneurs  will  concentrate  on
ctivities with  less  uncertain  outcomes.  Given  that  inef-
cient institutions  increase  the  ambiguity  about  the  link
etween entrepreneurs’  decisions  and  their  outcomes  (Li
nd Zahra,  2012),  this  ambiguity  is  less  important  when  the
ariance of  the  expected  outcome  is  low,  thus  increasing
he relative  entrepreneurship  rates  when  formal  institutions
o not  work  properly.  High  uncertainty  avoidance  reduces
he number  of  projects  undertaken,  especially  high  quality-
igh risk  ventures,  and  the  institutional  framework  becomes
ess important.  This  line  of  reasoning  is  similar  to  that  of  Li
nd Zahra  (2012)  who  analyze  the  decisions  taken  by  ven-
ure capitalists  to  invest  in  new  projects,  and  show  how
enture capitalists  are  less  responsive  to  incentives  offered
y formal  institutions  in  societies  with  greater  uncertainty
voidance.
Based on  the  above  arguments,  we  expect  that,  in  soci-
ties with  low  uncertainty  avoidance,  where  fear  of  failure
s small  and  willingness  to  take  risks  is  high,  the  incen-
ives offered  by  formal  institutions  can  be  understood  as  an
pportunity associated  with  the  creation  of  new  businesses,
hus stimulating  opportunity  entrepreneurship.
3. The  lower  uncertainty  avoidance,  the  stronger  the  pos-
tive relationship  between  formal  institutional  development
nd the  level  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship.
ample and variables
he  proposed  model  will  be  tested  using  an  unbalanced
anel data  set  of  84  countries  that  have  taken  part
n the  Global  Entrepreneurship  Monitor  (GEM)  project
etween 2002  and  2015.  GEM  is  an  international  research
roject that  started  in  1999  and  whose  main  objective  is
o assess  ‘‘entrepreneurial  activity,  aspirations  and  atti-
udes of  individuals  across  a  wide  range  of  countries’’
http://www.gemconsortium.org). It  initially  started  with
0  participants  but  coverage  rapidly  increased  as  a  number
f countries  joined  the  project.  In  any  case,  it  is  important
o note  that  most  countries  have  not  been  part  of  the  sample
hroughout the  whole  period.  There  are  two  main  reasons  for
his. The  first  one  is  that  some  nations  joined  the  project
everal years  after  2002.  The  second  is  that  a  number  ofPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
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ountries participated  only  in  specific  years.  Therefore,  our
ample finally  includes  an  unbalanced  panel  data  with  a  total
f 84  countries  with  586  observations.2
2 It is important to note here that, although a total of 107 coun-
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One  of  the  main  reasons  we  believe  that  the  GEM  obser-
atory is  a  good  laboratory  to  test  our  hypotheses  is  that
t presents  enough  heterogeneity  in  various  areas  that  are
rucial to  our  study,  including  the  level  of  economic  develop-
ent, the  legal  and  governmental  structures  and  the  social
nd cultural  norms  that  prevail  between  the  different  coun-
ries. In  other  words,  the  ‘‘variance’’  of  the  institutional
imension is  guaranteed.  It  is  important  to  recall  that  this
ariability is  a  necessary  condition  in  works  where  institu-
ions play  a  relevant  role,  given  that  no  absolute  conclusions
hould be  inferred  if  only  a  few  countries  take  part  in  the
tudy (Franke  and  Richey,  2010).
ependent  variable
ur  dependent  variable  is  opportunity  entrepreneurship
Reynolds et  al.,  2002).  Alvarez  and  Busenitz  (2001)
nderstand opportunity  as  a  central  element  of  quality
ntrepreneurship and  the  initiatives  that  derive  from  it  arise
s a result  of  the  desire  for  income,  wealth  and  achievement
Hessels et  al.,  2008;  Shane  et  al.,  1991;  McClelland,  1961).
In  this  context,  GEM  seems  to  be  particularly  rec-
mmended for  our  purposes.  Besides  identifying  the
ntrepreneurship rate  in  each  country  (defined  as  the  per-
entage of  population  aged  between  18  and  64  that  is
nvolved in  a  business  activity),  it  breaks  it  down  into  oppor-
unity and  necessity  entrepreneurship.  The  first  one  is  linked
o the  identification  of  good  business  opportunities  while,
n the  second,  firms  are  created  because  of  the  lack  of  bet-
er job  opportunities  and  not  because  of  identifying  a  clear
arket niche.  Accordingly,  our  proxy  for  the  level  of  oppor-
unity entrepreneurship  is  the  ratio  between  opportunity
ntrepreneurship and  the  total  of  population  aged  between
8 and  64  that  is  involved  in  a  business  activity  (opportunity
lus necessity).
ormal  institutions
ormal  institutions  will  be  proxied  through  the  six  gov-
rnance dimensions  developed  by  Kaufmann,  Kraay  and
astruzzi for  the  World  Bank  (WGI,  Worldwide  Governance
ndicators) (2009).  Governance  indicators  have  previously
een used  in  the  literature  with  very  similar  purposes  (Aidis
t al.,  2008;  Dau  and  Cuervo-Cazurra,  2014)  because  they
over a  wide  range  of  countries  and  have  been  proven  to
e very  accurate  (Thomas,  2010).  Kaufmann  et  al.  (2010)
efine governance  as  ‘‘the  traditions  and  institutions  by
hich authority  in  a  country  is  exercised’’  and  they  proxy  it
hrough a  set  of  six  indicators  that  ‘‘include  the  process  by
hich governments  are  selected,  monitored  and  replaced,
he capacity  of  the  government  to  effectively  formulate
nd implement  sound  policies  and  the  respect  of  citizens
nd the  state  for  the  institutions  that  govern  economic  and
ocial interactions  among  them’’  (Kaufmann  et  al.,  2010,  p.rmal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
). These  indicators  have  been  developed  for  215  countries
or the  period  between  1996  and  2016.  All  of  them  range
etween −2.5  and  2.5,  with  the  higher  scores  corresponding
015, we lose twenty-three countries due to missing data, reducing
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to  better  outcomes  of  institutions  and  vice  versa  (Kaufmann
et al.,  2010).
Given the  high  correlation  between  these  six  dimensions,
with values  ranging  from  0.74  to  0.96,  our  research  uses  prin-
cipal component  analysis  to  elaborate  a  composite  score  of
the formal  institutional  environment  (Garrido  et  al.,  2014).
The six  indicators  were  reduced  to  one  factor,  with  factor
loadings between  0.83  and  0.98.3 This  allows  us  to  capture
the formal  institutional  dimension  in  a  single  variable  and
we avoid  the  multicollinearity  problems  that  derive  from
the high  correlation  between  these  dimensions.  As  a  conse-
quence, we  will  use  the  factor  resulting  from  the  previous
principal component  analysis  to  measure  formal  institutions.
Informal  institutions:  culture
Most  of  the  entrepreneurship  research  that  considers  cultu-
ral variables  is  based  on  the  theory  of  Hofstede  (1980,  2001)
that shows  how  the  culture  of  societies  and  organizations
is influenced  by  different  features  deep-rooted  in  the  tradi-
tions of  the  different  territories.  Initially,  Hofstede  (2001)
established cultural  differences  through  four  dimensions:
power distance,  uncertainty  avoidance,  individualism  vs  col-
lectivism  and  masculinity  vs  femininity.  Recently,  Hofstede
et al.  (2010)  added  two  new  dimensions  to  their  cultural
model: long-term  orientation  and  indulgence  vs  restriction.
These indexes  usually  take  values  from  0  to  100  (although
they can  exceptionally  surpass  this  threshold),  where  higher
scores correspond  to  cultures  with  greater  power  distance,
more individualists,  more  masculine,  with  high  uncertainty
avoidance, more  based  on  a  long  term  approach  and  where
relatively free  gratification  of  basic  and  natural  human
desires related  to  enjoying  life  and  having  fun  is.
When  including  the  informal  institutional  component  and
as we  have  previously  argued,  our  study  considers  the  two
dimensions of  Hofstede  that  are  more  closely  related  to
entrepreneurship: Individualism  vs  collectivism  and  uncer-
tainty avoidance  (Mueller  and  Thomas,  2001;  Thomas  and
Mueller, 2000).
Control  variables
Our  study  also  includes  several  control  variables  that  take
into account  economic  and  demographic  characteristics  of
the countries  that  constitute  our  sample  and  that  have  pre-
viously been  considered  in  entrepreneurship  studies.  The
first is  the  degree  of  economic  activity,  proxied  through
GDP growth.  There  are  a  number  of  studies  that  document
the existence  of  a  positive  relationship  between  economic
growth and  entrepreneurship  and,  in  particular,  between
economic growth  and  quality  entrepreneurship  (see,  for  ins-
tance, Carree  et  al.,  2007).  Our  analysis  also  takes  into
account GDP  per  capita,  usually  positively  associated  with
entrepreneurship (Desai  et  al.,  2003).  The  existence  ofPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
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a suitable  financial  supply  is  also  incorporated  into  the
model since  it  facilitates  the  mobilization  of  resources  to
finance projects,  with  the  resulting  improvement  of  innova-
3 The Cronbach’s alpha came out to be 0.97, which is considered
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ive  activity  and  economic  growth  (King  and  Levine,  1993).
t has  been  observed  that  exploitation  of  opportunities  is
requently associated  with  a  greater  access  to  financial  cap-
tal (Hurst  and  Lusardi,  2004)  and  that  more  developed
nancial markets  promote  the  entry  and  growth  of  new
ompanies (Guiso  et  al.,  2004).  Consequently,  the  model
ncludes the  variable  financial  freedom  from  the  Index  of
conomic Freedom  (Holmes  et  al.,  2008),  as  a  proxy  of  the
nancial supply.  Moreover,  the  literature  has  shown  that  men
re more  active  in  entrepreneurship  than  women  (Minniti
t al.,  2005;  Adachi  and  Hisada,  2017)  and  that  men  obtain
etter performance  and  create  more  jobs  (Bosma  et  al.,
004). To  take  into  account  this  circumstance,  we  control
or the  female  rate  of  population  in  the  country.  Previous
tudies also  show  that  some  religions  are  more  conductive
o entrepreneurship  than  others  (Audretsch  et  al.,  2007),
o we  include  dummies  for  the  main  religions  in  the  world
Christianity, Judaism,  Islam  and  Buddhism).  These  dum-
ies take  a  value  of  1  for  the  religion  that  is  dominant  in
 country  and  0  otherwise,  being  Judaism  treated  as  the
eference category.  To  alleviate  multicollinearity  problems,
ll the  variables  are  standardized  to  have  a  mean  of  0  and
tandard deviation  of  1  and,  to  mitigate  simultaneity,  all  the
xplanatory variables  are  lagged  one  year  (Cornett  et  al.,
007).
The variables  used  in  our  empirical  model  and  the  data
ources are  summarized  in  Table  1.
escriptive  statistics
escriptive  statistics  and  correlations  between  our  varia-
les are  shown  in  Table  2.  As  can  be  observed,  the  ratio
hat approach  opportunity  entrepreneurship  takes  a  value
f 0.76.
The mean  value  of  the  indicator  that  proxies  formal  insti-
utions is  0.39.  The  range  of  values  of  this  variable,  between
1.78 and  1.85,  means  that  the  average  country  in  our
ample shows  a  reasonable  level  of  institutional  develop-
ent. The  standard  deviation  is  also  high,  indicating  that
ur sample  covers  a  wide  range  of  countries  with  very  differ-
nt institutional  contexts.  Regarding  informal  institutions,
he mean  values  of  individualism  and  uncertainty  avoidance
re, respectively,  47.33  and  66.02,  with  moderate  to  high
ariation among  the  different  observations.  When  we  ana-
yze the  correlation  matrix,  we  observe  that  opportunity
ntrepreneurship is  positively  correlated  with  formal  insti-
utions, individualism,  financial  freedom,  GDP  per  capita
nd Christianity.  On  the  other  hand,  the  correlation  is  nega-
ive between  opportunity  entrepreneurship  and  uncertainty
voidance, GDP  growth,  female  rate,  Buddhism  and  Islam.
Table  3  complements  the  information  provided  by
able 2.  First,  it  allows  us  to  verify  the  variability  within  the
nstitutional dimensions  (a  necessary  condition  to  address  a
tudy of  these  characteristics).  Second,  it  offers  some  rele-
ant details  about  the  exact  position  of  the  countries  of  our
ample both  in  relationship  to  the  dependent  variable  and
n the  variables  that  capture  the  effect  of  institutions.  Thermal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
rst aspect  that  attracts  our  attention  in  Table  3  (listed  from
iggest to  smallest  values  of  the  dependent  variable)  is  that
ountries with  higher  levels  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship
re usually  those  where  formal  institutions  are  more  devel-
Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Formal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
contingent  role  of  informal  institutions.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2018,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
ARTICLE IN PRESS+ModelBRQ-92; No. of Pages 20
8  L.  Fuentelsaz  et  al.
Table  1  Description  of  the  variables  used  in  the  study.
Dimension  Variable  Description  Source




TEA +  Necessity  TEA
Ratio of  the  adult  population  that  claims  to  be
involved  in  a  business  because  of  the  identification
of  a  market  opportunity  over  the  population  (aged
between  18  and  64)  who  had  initiated  a  venture  in
the  last  42  months  (opportunity  plus  necessity).
GEM
Formal institutions Voice and  Accountability  Ability  of  the  citizens  to  participate  in  selecting
their  government,  as  well  as  freedom  of  expression,
freedom  of  association,  and  free  media.
WGI
Political  Stability  Likelihood  that  the  government  will  be  destabilized
or  overthrown  by  unconstitutional  or  violent
means,  including  politically-motivated  violence  and
terrorism.
WGI
Government Effectiveness  Quality  of  public  services,  the  quality  of  the  civil
service  and  the  degree  of  its  independence  from
political  pressures,  the  quality  of  policy  formulation
and  implementation,  and  the  credibility  of  the
government’s  commitment  to  such  policies.
WGI
Regulatory  Quality Ability  of  the  government  to  formulate  and
implement  sound  policies  and  regulations  which
permit  and  promote  private  sector  development.
WGI
Rule of  Law  Confidence  of  the  agents  in  and  abidance  by  the
rules  of  society,  and  in  particular  the  quality  of
contract  enforcement,  property  rights,  the  police
and  the  courts,  as  well  as  the  likelihood  of  crime
and  violence.
WGI
Control of  Corruption  Extent  to  which  public  power  is  exercised  for
private  gain,  including  both  petty  and  grand  forms
of  corruption,  as  well  as c̈aptureöf  the  state  by




Individualism/  Collectivism  Extent  to  which  individuals  prefer  to  act  and  feel
recognized  as  individual  versus  being  part  of  a
group  or  collective.
Hofstede
Uncertainty  Avoidance  Extent  to  which  members  of  a  society  accept
uncertainty  and  ambiguity.
Hofstede
Control  variables GDP Growth  Annual  percentage  growth  rate  of  GDP  (local
currency).
WB
Financial freedom  Banking  efficiency  as  well  as  a  measure  of
independence  from  government  control  and
interference  in  the  financial  sector.
IEF
Population  female  Percentage  of  female  population  in  the  country.  WB
GDP per  capita  GDP  per  capita  is  gross  domestic  product  divided  by
midyear  population.
WB
Christianity  Dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  Christianity  is  the
dominant  religion  in  the  country.
ARDA
Buddhism  Dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  Buddhism  is  the
dominant  religion  in  the  country.
ARDA
Islam  Dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  Islam  is  the
dominant  religion  in  the  country.
ARDA
GEM = Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Reynolds et al., 2002).
WGI = Worldwide Governance Indicators of World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2009).
IEF  = Index Economic Freedom (Holmes et al., 2008).
Hofstede: see Hofstede (1980, 2001).
ARDA = World Bank and Association of religion data archives (http://www.thearda.com/).
WB = World Bank.
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ngent  role  of  informal  institutions  9
ped:  the  top  positions  in  both  rankings  are  held  by  countries
ike Denmark,  Iceland,  Norway,  Luxembourg  and  Sweden.
his preliminary  evidence  is  consistent  with  the  arguments
utlined in  our  Hypothesis  1.  A  less  clear  pattern  is  observed
n the  relationship  between  opportunity  entrepreneurship
nd the  individualistic  character  or  uncertainty  avoidance
n a society.  This  lack  of  a  clear  relationship  would  be  in  line
ith previous  evidence  that  does  not  identify  a  direct  impact
f the  informal  institutional  dimension  on  entrepreneurship.
herefore, this  evidence  could  suggest  a  moderation  effect
etween formal  and  informal  institutions.
A  second  feature  that  deserves  our  attention  is  the  distri-
ution of  the  sample.  In  spite  of  the  wide  range  of  variation
f our  variables  (which  is  a  key  feature  to  test  our  hypothe-
es), there  seems  to  be  a  slight  over-presence  of  countries
n which  the  development  of  formal  institutions  is  high.  This
s evidenced  by  the  fact  that  the  average  value  of  formal
nstitutions is  above  zero  (0.39).  This  is  not  the  case  with  the
ultural dimensions,  whose  means  and  variances  are  more
venly distributed.  The  variable  individualism  has  an  aver-
ge almost  in  the  center  of  the  range  of  the  variable  (do
ot forget  that  it  usually  ranges  between  0  and  100)  and
 standard  deviation  of  24.11.  The  values  for  uncertainty
voidance are  somewhat  more  skewed,  with  an  average  of
6.02 and  a  standard  deviation  of  23.04.
esults
o  take  the  nature  of  our  dependent  variable  into  account,
hich is  a  ratio  that  lies  between  0  and  1,  we  estimate  a
wo-limit tobit  model  (Long,  1997)  with  panel  data.4 Table  4
resents the  results  of  our  estimations.  All  of  them  are
obust to  heteroskedasticity  and  autocorrelation  (HAC).  To
est our  hypotheses,  we  estimate  five  models  where  the
ariables that  proxy  formal  institutions  and  their  interac-
ions with  informal  ones  are  introduced  in  a  nested  way.
odel 1  only  considers  the  influence  of  the  control  variables.
odel 2  introduces  the  direct  effect  of  formal  institutions
n the  level  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship  (Hypothe-
is 1).  Models  3  and  4  add,  respectively,  the  interaction
etween formal  institutions  and  individualism  (Hypothesis
), and  between  formal  institutions  and  uncertainty  avoid-
nce (Hypothesis  3).  Finally,  Model  5  is  the  full  model  that
ncorporates all  the  interactions.
It  is  important  to  note  that  several  of  our  models  include
nteraction terms,  which  implies  that  some  multicollinearity
roblems may  arise.  To  assess  their  importance,  we  calcu-
ate the  variance  inflation  factors  (VIFs).  In  the  models  no
ariable has  a  VIF  above  the  usual  threshold  of  10,  which
uggests there  are  not  multicollinearity  problems  (see  VIF
ean in  Table  4).
Focusing our  analysis  on  the  results  of  the  model  that
nly includes  the  control  variables,  we  observe  that  GDP
rowth has  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  the  level  of
pportunity entrepreneurship.  This  may  indicate  that  higherrmal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
conomic  growth  is  related  to  the  availability  of  better  busi-
ess opportunities,  and  something  similar  happens  with  GDP
er capita.  It  is  also  important  to  note  that  these  variables
4 The estimations are conducted using STATA software package.
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Table  3  Average  institutional  features  by  country.
Country  Level  of  opportunity
entrepreneurship
Formal  institutions  Individualism  Uncertainty
Denmark  0.94  1.74  74  23
Iceland  0.92 1.58  60  50
Norway  0.92 1.61 69  50
Luxembourg  0.90 1.07 60  70
Sweden  0.90 1.66 71  29
Saudi  Arabia  0.89  −0.62  25  80
The  Netherlands  0.89  1.56  80  53
Austria  0.89  1.46  55  70
New  Zealand  0.88  1.65  79  49
United  Arab  Emirates  0.88  0.25  25  80
Surinam  0.88  −0.21  47  92
Switzerland  0.87  1.63  68  58
Trinidad  and  Tobago  0.86  −0.11  16  55
Singapore  0.86  1.27  20  8
Malaysia  0.85  0.05  26  36
Canada  0.85  1.49  80  48
Australia  0.85  1.47  90  51
Belgium  0.85  1.17  75  94
United  Kingdom  0.84  1.29  89  35
Slovenia  0.84  0.75  27  88
Italy  0.84  0.36  76  75
Finland  0.84  1.77  63  59
Estonia  0.84  0.96  60  60
United  States  0.82  1.11  91  46
Mexico  0.82  −0.47  30  82
Indonesia  0.80  −0.62  14  48
Spain  0.80  0.73  51  86
Ireland  0.80  1.36  70  35
Ethiopia  0.80  −1.31  20  55
Portugal  0.79  0.82  27  99
Latvia  0.78  0.44  70  63
Thailand  0.78 −0.61  20  64
Israel  0.77  0.39  54  81
Lebanon  0.77 −1.09  40  50
Jordan  0.76 −0.28 30  65
Uruguay  0.76 0.57 36  99
Japan  0.76  1.04  46  92
France  0.76  1.06  71  86
Lithuania  0.76  0.60  60  65
Costa  Rica  0.75  0.48  15  86
Burkina  Faso  0.75  −0.78  15  55
Chile  0.75  0.99  23  86
Peru  0.74  −0.59  16  87
Germany  0.74  1.34  67  65
Greece  0.74  0.27  35  100
Czech  Republic  0.73  0.68  58  74
Morocco  0.73  −0.65  46  68
Panama  0.73  −0.10  11  86
Bangladesh  0.73  −1.23  20  60
Senegal  0.73  −0.35  25  55
India  0.72  −0.48  48  40
Romania  0.72  −0.03  30  90
Hungary  0.71  0.53  80  82
Hong  Kong  0.71  1.30  25  29
Venezuela  0.71  −1.60  12  76
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Table  3  (Continued)
Country  Level  of  opportunity
entrepreneurship
Formal institutions  Individualism  Uncertainty
Vietnam  0.69  −1.00  20  30
Nigeria  0.69  −1.54  30  55
Russia  0.69  −1.13  39  95
Ecuador  0.69  −1.06  8  67
Angola  0.69  −1.47  18  60
Dominican  Republic  0.68  −0.74  30  45
Colombia  0.68  −0.66  13  80
Ghana  0.67 −0.22 15  65
Bulgaria  0.66 −0.07 30  85
South  Africa 0.66 0.05 65  49
Guatemala  0.66  −0.95  6  99
Slovakia  0.66  0.59  52  51
Argentina  0.66  −0.62  46  86
El  Salvador 0.66  −0.30  19  94
Zambia  0.65 −0.63  35  50
Turkey 0.64 −0.34 37  85
Namibia  0.64 0.06  30  45
The  Philippines 0.64 −0.56 32  44
Brazil  0.62 −0.30 38  76
South  Korea 0.62 0.54 18  85
Jamaica  0.61 −0.28 39  13
Croatia  0.61 0.13 33  80
Iran  0.60 −1.57 41  59
Egypt  0.60  −1.04  25  80
Poland  0.59  0.61  60  93
China  0.59  −0.95  20  30
Malawi  0.57  −0.73  30  50
Serbia  0.57  −0.60  25  92
Pakistan  0.51  −1.56  14  70

















Standard  deviation  0.11  
maintain  their  sign  and  significance  across  the  five  models.
The female  rate  is  negative  and  significant  in  models  1,  2  and
4 so,  the  higher  the  rate  of  females  in  a  given  country,  the
lower the  level  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The  other
variables we  consider  (financial  freedom  and  religion)  usu-
ally present  the  expected  signs,  although  their  coefficients
are not  statistically  significant,  with  the  exceptions  of  finan-
cial freedom,  which  is  positive  and  significant  in  models  1
and 2,  and  Buddhism,  which  is  negative  and  significant  in
models 3  and  5.
Although our  theoretical  predictions  analyze  the  impact
of informal  institutions  from  a  contingent  perspective,  we
comment on  the  direct  effect  of  the  two  variables  that  cap-
ture the  informal  component  of  the  institutions,  namely,
uncertainty avoidance  and  individualism.  As  we  can  observe,
individualism is  negative  and  significant  and  uncertainty
avoidance is  positive  but  not  significant  in  any  model.
Formal  institutions  show  a  positive  and  significant
relationship (ˇ  =  0.36,  p  <  0.01)  with  the  level  of  oppor-Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
contingent  role  of  informal  institutions.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2018
tunity entrepreneurship  (Model  2),  suggesting  that,  in
countries where  formal  institutions  are  more  developed,
entrepreneurship is,  in  general,  of  higher  quality.  This  result





0.94  24.11  23.04
The interaction  term  between  formal  institutions  and
ndividualism (Model  3)  is  also  positive  and  significant
 ̌ =  0.11,  p  <  0.01)  while  the  interaction  with  uncertainty
voidance (Model  4)  takes  the  expected  negative  sign
 ̌ =  −0.08,  p  <  0.01),  suggesting  that,  in  countries  with
igher individualism,  the  relationship  between  the  develop-
ent of  formal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneur-
hip is  more  intense  while,  in  countries  with  lower
ncertainty avoidance,  the  relation  is  also  negatively  rein-
orced. Model  5  includes  all  the  explanatory  variables  and,
ccording to  the  F-tests  shown  at  the  end  of  Table  4,  it  is
he model  that  best  fits  our  data.
All  the  relevant  variables  maintain  their  sign  and  remain
tatistically significant,  so  our  previous  conclusions  hold.
verall, the  results  of  Model  5  give  support  to  our  Hypothe-
es 1,  2  and  3.
Fig. 1a  and  b  presents  a  graphical  illustration  of  our
esults with  the  aim  of  providing  a  more  nuanced  analy-
is of  the  moderating  effect  of  the  informal  dimension  onrmal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
he relation  between  formal  institutions  and  the  level  of
pportunity entrepreneurship.  Fig.  1a  shows  the  moderat-
ng effect  of  individualism  (Hypothesis  2).  Using  coefficient
stimates from  the  fully  specified  model  in  Table  4  and
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Table  4  Formal  institutions,  informal  institutions  and  the  level  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship.
Model  1  Model  2  Model  3  Model  4  Model  5
Formal  institutions 0.364*** 0.461*** 0.389*** 0.469***
(6.19)  (7.04)  (6.58)  (7.18)
Formal institu-













GDP Growth 0.108*** 0.115*** 0.097*** 0.105*** 0.090**
(2.93)  (3.23)  (2.70)  (2.90)  (2.49)
Female rate −0.087* −0.107** −0.073 −0.113** −0.081
(−1.67) (−2.11)  (−1.41)  (−2.23)  (−1.56)
Financial freedom 0.222*** 0.084* 0.051  0.045  0.025
(5.54) (1.87)  (1.09)  (0.96)  (0.52)
GDP per  capita 0.471*** 0.281*** 0.250*** 0.249*** 0.229***
(13.62)  (6.18)  (5.02)  (5.33)  (4.55)
Christianity 0.031 −0.007  −0.045  −0.031  −0.058
(0.31) (−0.08)  (−0.45)  (−0.31)  (−0.59)
Buddhism −0.056 −0.086  −0.111* −0.094  −0.115*
(−0.91) (−1.44)  (−1.85)  (−1.56)  (−1.88)
Islam 0.100 0.104  0.092  0.081  0.074
(0.99) (1.06)  (0.94)  (0.82)  (0.76)
Constant −0.104*** −0.124*** −0.200*** −0.133*** −0.196***
(−3.09)  (−3.78)  (−4.77)  (−4.04)  (−4.61)
N 586  586  586  586  586
R2 0.19  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.23
F-Test vs.  1 38.34*** 24.92*** 23.16*** 18.30***
F-Test  vs.  2 7.98*** 7.13*** 5.72***
F-Test  vs.  3 4.66**
F-Test  vs.  4  5.49**
VIF  mean  3.63  3.89  3.86  3.52  3.53
Standard errors in parentheses.
























*** p < 0.01.
onsidering  the  average  of  the  other  moderating  variable
uncertainty avoidance)  of  66.02,  we  analyze  the  effect  of
ormal institutions  on  the  level  of  opportunity  entrepreneur-
hip when  individualism  is  low  (one  standard  deviation  below
he mean),  when  it  is  equal  to  the  mean,  and  when  it  is
igh (one  standard  deviation  above  the  mean).  We  observe
hat for  a  medium  formal  institutional  development  (values
f the  formal  institutions  variable  close  to  zero),  differ-
nces in  the  levels  of  individualism  in  a  country  hardlyPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
contingent  role  of  informal  institutions.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2018
ead to  significant  variations  in  the  levels  of  opportunity
ntrepreneurship.  However,  these  differences  become  more
ronounced as  the  formal  institutions  development  move





es  of  formal  institutions,  the  individualistic  character  of  a
ociety improves  the  relation  between  formal  institutions
nd the  level  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  However,
here formal  institutions  are  less  developed,  a  collectivistic
ulture favors  their  relation  with  quality  entrepreneurship.
A  similar  assessment  can  be  carried  out  when  we  analyze
he effect  of  formal  institutions  on  the  level  of  opportunity
ntrepreneurship for  different  values  of  uncertainty  avoid-
nce. With  this  aim  in  mind,  again  from  the  full  model  (Modelrmal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
) and  considering  an  average  value  for  individualism  of
7.33, we  analyze  the  effect  of  formal  institutions  when
ncertainty avoidance  takes  low,  medium  and  high  scores.
ig. 1b  shows  that  the  moderating  effect  of  uncertainty
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ship.  (b)  Moderating  effect  of  uncertainty  avoidance  in  the  r
entrepreneurship.
avoidance  on  the  relation  between  formal  institutional
development and  the  level  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship
increases when  formal  institutions  shifts  away  from  zero.
In other  words,  the  degree  of  uncertainty  avoidance  has  a
limited effect  on  entrepreneurial  rates  when  formal  insti-
tutions have  a  medium  level  of  development.  However,  the
picture changes  dramatically  for  high  (low)  levels  of  devel-
opment of  formal  institutions.  In  this  case,  a  lower  (greater)
aversion can  potentiate  (reduce)  the  level  of  opportunity
entrepreneurship.
Further analysisPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
contingent  role  of  informal  institutions.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2018
Although  we  have  previously  argued  that  individualism  and
uncertainty avoidance  are  the  two  more  salient  Hofstede





on  between  formal  institutions  and  the  level  of  opportunity
ty  (Thomas  and  Mueller,  2000;  Li  and  Zahra,  2012;  Mueller
nd Thomas,  2001,  Levie  and  Hunt,  2004),  the  Hofstede
odel of  national  culture  consists  of  six  dimensions:  power
istance, individualism  or  collectivism,  masculinity  vs  fem-
ninity, uncertainty  avoidance,  long-term  orientation  and
ndulgence vs  restriction.  Table  5  offers  definitions  of  all  of
hem.
In Table  6,  we  offer  additional  empirical  evidence  on
he contingent  impact  of  informal  institutions  on  the  level
f opportunity  entrepreneurship.  We  estimate  six  different
odels, taking  into  account  the  six  Hofstede  dimensions
ust defined.  Given  the  multicollinearity  problems  that  arise
hen all  the  dimensions  are  included  in  the  same  modelrmal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
the VIF  is  substantially  above  the  usual  threshold  of  10),
e present  their  effects  one  by  one.  It  is  important  to
ote that  we  include  the  same  control  variables  as  in  pre-
ious models.  All  of  them  remain  qualitatively  the  same.
ARTICLE IN PRESS+ModelBRQ-92; No. of Pages 20
14  L.  Fuentelsaz  et  al.
Table  5  Description  of  the  Hofstede  dimensions.
Dimension  Description
Power  distance  The  degree  to  which  the  less  powerful  members  of  a  society  accept  and  expect  that
power is  distributed  unequally
Individualism/Collectivism  Individualism  can  be  defined  as  a  preference  for  a  loosely-knit  social  framework  in
which  individuals  are  expected  to  take  care  of  only  themselves  and  their  immediate
families. Collectivism  represents  a  preference  for  a  tightly-knit  framework  in  society  in
which individuals  can  expect  their  relatives  or  members  of  a  particular  in-group  to  look
after  them  in  exchange  for  unquestioning  loyalty.
Masculinity/Femininity  The  Masculinity  side  of  this  dimension  represents  a  preference  in  society  for
achievement, heroism,  assertiveness,  and  material  rewards  for  success.  Femininity
stands for  a  preference  for  cooperation,  modesty,  caring  for  the  weak  and  quality  of
life.  Society  at  large  is  more  consensus-oriented.
Uncertainty  Avoidance  The  degree  to  which  the  members  of  a  society  feel  uncomfortable  with  uncertainty  and
ambiguity
Long term  orientation/Short
term orientation
Societies  who  score  low  on  this  dimension,  for  example,  prefer  to  maintain
time-honoured traditions  and  norms  while  viewing  societal  change  with  suspicion.T
hose with  a  culture  which  scores  high,  on  the  other  hand,  take  a  more  pragmatic
approach: they  encourage  thrift  and  efforts  in  modern  education  as  a  way  to  prepare
for the  future.
Indulgence/Restrain  Indulgence  stands  for  a  society  that  allows  relatively  free  gratification  of  basic  and
natural human  drives  related  to  enjoying  life  and  having  fun.  Restraint  stands  for  a














































Source: Hofstede (1980, 2001).
ccordingly,  we  focus  our  comments  on  both  the  direct  and
oderating impacts  of  Hofstede  dimensions.
Models  1  and  2  consider  the  moderating  impact  of  individ-
alism and  uncertainty  avoidance  on  the  level  of  opportunity
ntrepreneurship. As  can  be  observed,  these  models  coin-
ide with  Models  3  and  4  already  commented  in  Table  4.
t can  be  seen  that  there  is  a  difference  in  terms  of  the
umber of  observations  (586  vs  532),  which  comes  from  the
act that  not  all  the  Hofstede  dimensions  are  equally  avail-
ble for  the  same  number  of  countries.5 For  comparative
urposes, we  have  kept  the  number  of  observations  equal
mong models.  For  our  sample,  indulgency  is  the  dimension
ith the  fewest  observations.  This  is  why  the  number  of
bservations is  slightly  reduced.  In  any  case,  the  interpreta-
ion of  Models  1  and  2,  where  individualism  and  uncertainty
voidance are  introduced,  is  the  same  as  we  have  previously
ffered.
Model 3  shows  that  the  direct  effect  of  power  distance
s not  significant,  while  the  interactions  with  formal  institu-
ions is  negative  and  significant  (ˇ  =  −0.120,  p  <  0.01).  This
eans that  countries  where  power  distance  is  high,  thatPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
contingent  role  of  informal  institutions.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2018
s, that  people  accept  a  hierarchical  order  in  which  every-
ody has  a  place,  negatively  moderates  the  relationships
etween formal  institutions  and  the  level  of  opportunity
5 For instance, there are 13 countries with scores for individu-
lism and uncertainty avoidance, but not for indulgence. These
ountries  are Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Panamá,
yria,  Malawi, Surinam, Senegal, Israel, Arab Emirates, Namibia y
akistan.  There are other cases of dimensions that are only available











ntrepreneurship.  Model  4  provides  empirical  evidence  on
he negative  relationship  between  masculinity  and  the  level
f opportunity  entrepreneurship,  but,  in  this  case,  the  inter-
ction  with  formal  institutions  is  not  significant.  Similarly,
odel 5  shows  that  only  the  direct  effect  of  long-term  ori-
ntation is  negative  and  significant,  but  not  the  interaction
erm. Finally,  Model  6  presents  the  relationship  between
ndulgence and  the  level  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship.
esults show  that  the  direct  effect  of  this  dimension  is  pos-
tive and  significant,  but  the  moderating  effect  with  formal
nstitutions is  not.
This empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  of  additional  Hof-
tede dimensions,  shown  in  Table  6,  gives  us  the  possibility
o elaborate  on  the  interplay  between  formal  institutions
nd other  dimensions  of  the  informal  component  of  insti-
utions. Further  research  should  theoretically  explore  these
elationships.
iscussion and conclusions
he  main  objective  of  this  research  has  been  to  pro-
ide a more  detailed  picture  of  the  relationship  between
nstitutions and  the  level  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship.
e build  on  the  well-established  distinction  between  for-
al and  informal  institutions  proposed  by  North  (1990)
nd we  acknowledge  that,  although  previous  literature  hasrmal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
requently  addressed  these  two  institutional  components
eparately, our  proposal  suggests  that  they  should  be  jointly
onsidered for  a  better  understanding  of  their  impact  on
ntrepreneurship.
Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Formal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
contingent  role  of  informal  institutions.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2018,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
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Table  6  Formal  institutions  and  the  six  dimensions  of  Hofstede.
Model  1  Model  2  Model  3  Model  4  Model  5  Model  6
Formal  institutions 0.453*** 0.373*** 0.375*** 0.306*** 0.391*** 0.384***
(0.066)  (0.063)  (0.0640)  (0.062)  (0.064)  (0.063)
Formal






institutions ×  uncertainty
−0.063*
(0.037)
Uncertainty  avoidance −0.021
(0.043)




Power  distance 0.055
(0.054)
Formal









Long  term  orientation −0.108***
(0.039)




GDP growth 0.072* 0.077** 0.076** 0.081** 0.088** 0.084**
(0.037)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.036)
Female rate −0.023  −0.184* −0.148  −0.158  −0.0817  0.117
(0.114) (0.110)  (0.107)  (0.114)  (0.113)  (0.124)
Financial freedom 0.075  0.069  0.098** 0.135*** 0.096** 0.064
(0.048) (0.049)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.046)
GDP per  capita 0.238*** 0.233*** 0.215*** 0.262*** 0.275*** 0.244***
(0.050)  (0.048)  (0.050)  (0.045)  (0.047)  (0.046)
Christianity −0.004  −0.039  −0.036  −0.038  −0.101  −0.171
(0.188) (0.190)  (0.189)  (0.186)  (0.190)  (0.188)
Buddhism −0.089  −0.108  −0.089  −0.076  −0.095  −0.117
(0.106) (0.107)  (0.107)  (0.105)  (0.107)  (0.105)
Islam 0.169  0.083  0.098  0.104  0.060  0.091
(0.171) (0.172)  (0.172)  (0.169)  (0.173)  (0.169)
Constant −0.202*** −0.094** −0.161*** −0.098** −0.115*** −0.148***
(0.050)  (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.039)
N 532  532  532  532  532  532
R2 0.23  0.22  0.22  0.23  0.22  0.23
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
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Within  this  context,  our  contention  is  that  not  all  the  ini-
iatives have  the  same  positive  effects  on  wealth  creation.
e argue  that  opportunity  entrepreneurs  are  especially
otivated to  start  and  develop  larger  and  more  valuable
rms and  that  these  firms  have  clear  implications  on  eco-
omic growth  and  innovation  (Wong  et  al.,  2005).  As  a
onsequence, we  elaborate  on  the  relationship  between
pportunity entrepreneurship  and  institutions.  Our  main
ndings confirm  our  assumptions  and,  although  it  is  true
hat the  highest  opportunity  entrepreneurship  rates  are
bserved in  countries  where  the  rules  of  the  game  (for-
al institutions)  are  well  defined,  culture  and  society  values
informal institutions)  greatly  affect  the  process  of  business
reation through  their  moderating  effect  on  formal  institu-
ions. Particularly,  in  more  individualistic-oriented  countries
he relation  between  formal  institutions  and  the  level  of
pportunity entrepreneurship  is  more  intense.  This  rela-
ionship is  also  strengthened  when  uncertainty  avoidance
s lower.  Nevertheless,  there  are  some  countries  whose  val-
es in  these  dimensions  deserve  our  attention.  Germany,
or example,  has  a  relatively  low  presence  of  opportunity
ntrepreneurship, in  spite  of  its  strong  formal  institutions,  a
elatively high  individualism  and  an  average  level  of  uncer-
ainty avoidance.  Belgium,  one  of  the  countries  with  the
ighest uncertainty  avoidance,  shows  an  impressive  level
f opportunity  entrepreneurship  based  on  highly  developed
ormal institutions  combined  with  a  very  individualistic  soci-
ty. These  figures  contrast  with  those  observed  in  Poland,
ith similar  uncertainty  avoidance  and  a  not  very  different
evel of  individualism;  however,  the  limited  development  of
ormal institution  in  this  country  results  in  a  very  low  level
f opportunity  entrepreneurship.  There  are  also  countries
hat present  high  levels  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship
lthough their  formal  institutions  are  underdeveloped,  for
xample, Saudi  Arabia,  Trinidad  and  Tobago  and  Mexico.
Our  analysis  has  contributed  to  the  existing  literature
oth from  a  theoretical  and  an  empirical  point  of  view.
he discussion  initiated  by  Baumol  (1990),  where  produc-
ive and  unproductive  entrepreneurship  are  dependent  on
he prevailing  rules  of  the  game,  has  opened  a  prolific
tream of  research.  Some  previous  studies,  including  Sobel
2008), have  contributed  to  empirically  testing  Baumol’s
ostulates and  further  literature  has  called  for  the  consid-
ration of  not  only  the  number  of  new  ventures  but  also
heir quality  (Li  and  Zahra,  2012).  However,  most  previous
esearch only  provides  a  limited  approach  to  this  anal-
sis. Some  studies  analyze  the  type  of  entrepreneurship
ut they  do  not  take  into  account  the  institutional  compo-
ent (Acs,  2006;  Block  and  Sandner,  2009).  Other  scholars
nclude formal  institutions  in  their  analyses  of  the  type  of
ntrepreneurship but  they  omit  the  role  played  by  informal
nstitutions (Sobel,  2008).  Finally,  additional  work  analyzes
he different  dimensions  of  culture  and  their  impact  on  the
ype of  entrepreneurial  activity  (Hechavarria  and  Reynolds,
009). Our  work  contributes  to  fill  this  gap  by  proposing
hat the  approach  to  institutions  should  be  more  granular
nd consider  formal  institutions,  as  well  as  their  interac-
ions with  informal  ones,  as  key  factors  that  determinePlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
contingent  role  of  informal  institutions.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2018
pportunity entrepreneurship.  Existing  research  shows  very
ixed results  on  the  relationship  between  dimensions  such
s individualism  and  uncertainty  avoidance  and  new  ven-
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007).  In  our  paper,  we  show  that,  to  better  understand
he impact  of  informal  institutions  on  entrepreneurship,
hey need  to  be  contextualized.  The  interplay  between
ormal and  informal  institutions  provides  a  more  nuanced
icture on  how  institutions  affect  entrepreneurial  behavior.
ur research  also  contributes  to  the  literature  by  isolating
pportunity entrepreneurship,  which  has  traditionally  been
onsidered of  higher  quality.  It  increases  economic  growth
nd employment  to  a  greater  extent,  thus  generating  higher
xternalities for  society.  As  a  consequence,  its  separate
nalysis facilitates  the  adoption  of  better  managerial  and
olicy decisions.
olicy implications
he  paper  has  relevant  implications  from  a  public  policy
oint of  view.  Despite  the  growing  adoption  of  measures
o encourage  the  creation  of  new  ventures,  it  is  impera-
ive to  take  into  account  that  not  all  the  initiatives  have
he same  impact  on  value  creation  and  economic  growth.
s Sobel  (2008)  argues,  it  is  not  uncommon  to  identify
ntrepreneurial projects  that  simply  receive  public  funds
hrough subsidies  and  grants,  but  with  a  doubtful  contribu-
ion to  value  creation  (zero-sum  economic  activities).  For
his reason,  the  stimuli  provided  by  governments  should
ssentially focus  on  allocating  resources  to  initiatives  with  a
reater innovative  component  or  with  high  potential  growth.
Another  implication  from  a  public  policy  perspective  is
he importance  of  strengthening  formal  institutions,  partic-
larly in  less  developed  countries  where  the  rules  of  the
ame are  usually  less  clear.  Policymakers  in  these  coun-
ries should  be  conscious  of  the  positive  effects  in  terms
f development  and  wealth  creation  of  giving  sufficient
ttention to  reinforcing  the  regulatory  framework.  In  any
ase, formal  institutions  should  not  be  managed  in  isola-
ion; they  are  contingent  on  informal  ones.  It  is  important
o be  aware  that  similar  formal  institutions  may  have  dif-
erent effects  on  new  business  creation  depending  on  the
nformal institutions  (Li  and  Zahra,  2012;  Rodrik,  2007).
nfortunately, it  is  not  easy  to  establish  a  clear  causal  rela-
ionship between  policymakers’  actions  and  society  values.
hus, the  effect  of  the  decisions  adopted  with  respect  to
hese variables  is  difficult  to  identify,  given  that  they  are
nly perceived  in  the  long  run.  It  is  true  that  governments
re frequently  conditioned  by  short-term  outcomes  but  they
hould be  conscious  of  the  positive  consequences  of  the
fforts that  derive  from  this  type  of  decisions.  As  a  conse-
uence, public  authorities  should  promote  measures,  such
s improving  the  social  recognition  of  the  entrepreneur  and
ighlighting the  long-term  consequences  of  the  quality  of
ntrepreneurship, aimed  at  sensitizing  citizens  to  devel-
ping their  entrepreneurial  spirit.  The  inclusion  of  issues
elated to  entrepreneurship  at  different  educational  levels
nd raising  awareness  of  the  importance  of  entrepreneurs  in
ociety are  only  some  of  the  challenges  facing  governments
n the  promotion  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship.rmal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneurship.  The
,  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brq.2018.06.002
imitations and future research
ur  results  also  leave  several  questions  unanswered  that  will
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ied  formal  institutions  through  an  aggregate  index,  which
tries to  measure  objective  perceptions  about  the  quality
of formal  institutions  in  different  countries.  Undoubtedly,
perceptions may  often  be  as  important  as  objective  differ-
ences in  institutions  across  countries  (Kaufmann  et  al.,  1999,
p. 2)  but  it  would  be  of  interest  if  future  work  provides  a
more disaggregated  analysis  of  formal  institutions,  including
dimensions such  as  economic  freedom,  political  stability,  the
quality and  independence  of  public  services,  ease  of  access
to finance,  the  control  of  corruption  or  legal  security.  It  can-
not be  discarded  that  the  interaction  between  these  factors
and informal  institutions  would  be  heterogeneous.  As  the
moderating effect  of  informal  institutions  would  be  contin-
gent to  each  (or  some)  of  these  dimensions,  our  knowledge
would be  enriched  by  identifying  adequate  variables  that
measure and  assess  them  separately.
Second,  our  analysis  does  not  distinguish  between  formal
and informal  (non-registered)  entrepreneurship.  It  seems
to be  clear  that  their  characteristics  are  completely  dif-
ferent and  that  the  ventures  that  take  place  outside  the
official economy  are  more  often  necessity-driven  and  would
be of  lower  quality.  By  way  of  example,  the  literature
has shown  that  an  improvement  of  the  quality  of  formal
institutions leads  to  an  increase  in  the  level  of  formal  com-
pared to  informal  entrepreneurship  (Autio  and  Fu,  2015;
Dau and  Cuervo-Cazurra,  2014)  and  that  the  level  of  infor-
mal entrepreneurship  is  dependent  on  industry  conditions
(Siqueira et  al.,  2016).  Nevertheless,  a  deeper  analysis
of their  differences  would  increase  our  comprehension  of
opportunity entrepreneurship.
Third, our  empirical  analysis  has  been  performed  through
the use  of  GEM  data.  This  has  the  advantage  of  providing  us
with a  wide  variety  of  cultural  contexts,  which  is  the  excep-
tion in  studies  that  relate  entrepreneurship  and  institutional
theory (Bruton  et  al.,  2010).  However,  GEM  data  are  not
free from  criticism.  For  example,  GEM  coverage  --  at  least
at the  beginning  of  the  project  --  is  slightly  biased  toward
developed countries,  which  might  limit  the  variability  of  our
independent variables.  It  is  true  that  the  sample  has  been
widened in  recent  years  so  we  can  expect  a  more  homo-
geneous representativeness  in  the  near  future.  Our  hope
is that  entrepreneurship  scholarship  will  develop  and  test
more complex  measures  that  improve  the  accuracy  of  the
findings.
Fourth, culture  is  assumed  to  be  a  construct  that  is
extremely stable  over  time.  Hofstede  (1980,  2001)  gathered
the information  used  to  develop  his  first  set  of  indicators  in
the late  70s  and  revised  it  in  the  late  90s.  However,  it  can
be argued  that,  in  a  highly  dynamic  world,  cultural  patterns
may evolve  over  time  (Inglehart  and  Baker,  2000),  which
raises concerns  about  whether  the  indices  collected  by  Hof-
stede a  few  decades  ago  are  still  relevant  (Jones,  2007).
As a  consequence,  future  research  should  make  additional
efforts to  update  (or  complete)  these  indicators  with  the  aim
of taking  new  cultural  patterns  into  account  in  a  landscape
that is  becoming  more  and  more  global.
Fifth,  we  analyze  culture  at  the  national  level  to  pre-
dict rates  of  opportunity  entrepreneurship  also  at  nationalPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Fuentelsaz,  L.,  et  al.,  Fo
contingent  role  of  informal  institutions.  BRQ  Bus.  Res.  Q.  2018
level. However,  culture  is  a  multi-level  construct  that  ranges
from  the  macro  to  the  individual  level  (Erez  and  Gati,  2004).
The effects  of  culture  at  the  individual  level  remain  largely
understudied. Subsequent  analysis  should  explore  the  role
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f  culture  at  the  individual  level  as  a  possible  moderator
etween formal  institutions  and  opportunity  entrepreneur-
hip. Similarly,  our  macro-level  analysis  is  centered  on  the
nstitutional side.  However,  there  are  probably  other  macro
imensions that  may  influence  the  propensity  toward  oppor-
unity entrepreneurship;  thus,  future  research  would  benefit
rom identifying  new,  potentially  relevant,  variables.
Finally,  although  our  work  considers  a  moderating  rela-
ionship between  formal  and  informal  institutions  and  we
nd strong  empirical  evidence  that  confirms  this  relation-
hip, we  do  not  investigate  whether  formal  institutions
ediate the  relationship  between  culture  and  opportunity
ntrepreneurship. Exploring  mediation  relationships  would
e a  promising  area  for  future  research  (Holmes  et  al.,
013).
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